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Abstract—Smart contract platforms, the most notable of which
is probably Ethereum, facilitate the development of important
and diverse distributed applications (e.g., naming services and
fungible tokens) in a simple manner. This simplicity stems from
the inherent utility of employing the state of smart contracts
to store, query and verify the validity of application data. In
Ethereum, data storage incurs an underpriced, non-recurring,
predefined fee. Furthermore, as there is no incentive for freeing
or minimizing the state of smart contracts, Ethereum is faced
with a tragedy of the commons problem with regards to its
monotonically increasing state. This issue, if left unchecked, may
lead to centralization and directly impact Ethereum’s security
and longevity.
In this work, we introduce an alternative paradigm for
developing smart contracts in which their state is of constant
size and facilitates the verification of application data that are
stored to and queried from an external, potentially unreliable,
storage network. This approach is relevant for a wide range
of applications, such as any key-value store. We evaluate our
approach by adapting the most widely deployed standard for
fungible tokens, i.e., the ERC20 token standard. We show that
Ethereum’s current cost model penalizes our approach, even
though it minimizes the overhead to Ethereum’s state and
aligns well with Ethereum’s future. We address Ethereum’s
monotonically increasing state in a two-fold manner. First, we
introduce recurring fees that are proportional to the state of
smart contracts and adjustable by the miners that maintain
the network. Second, we propose a scheme where the cost of
storage-related operations reflects the effort that miners have
to expend to execute them. Lastly, we show that under such a
pricing scheme that encourages economy in the state consumed
by smart contracts, our ERC20 token adaptation reduces the
incurred transaction fees by up to an order of magnitude.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin ([1]) revolutionized the world of digital payments by
allowing untrusted entities to transact securely without relying
on trusted, third parties. Its operation is based on a distributed
network of peers with open membership that maintains a
highly replicated, auditable, append-only log of transactions,
which is commonly referred to as a blockchain. A second
generation of blockchains allows the development of smart
contracts ([2]), i.e., digital agents that encode, execute and
enforce arbitrary agreements. Smart contract platforms provide
the means of developing diverse and important distributed
applications (dApps) in a simple manner that, prior to their
introduction, was challenging to implement.
Ethereum ([3]) is probably the most notable smart contract
platform. Its live chain features dApps that implement naming
services ([4]), multisignature wallets ([5]), a large variety of
fungible tokens ([6]) and even crypto-collectibles ([7]), all
in just a few lines of code. The simplicity of developing
dApps on top of these platforms stems from the inherent
utility of employing the state of smart contracts to store, query
and verify the validity of application data. For instance, all
implementations of the most widely deployed standard for
fungible tokens, i.e., the ERC20 token standard ([8]), store
each account’s token balance on the contract’s state.
Today, Ethereum’s cost model does not adequately take into
account the amount of storage consumed by smart contracts.
This is problematic for several reasons. First, in Ethereum,
storing data on the state of smart contracts requires paying one,
non-recurring fee at the time the data is stored. Thus, regard-
less of the amount of state that they consume, contracts have
zero maintenance costs and can be part of Ethereum’s state
forever. Second, storage-related operations are underpriced,
as stated by Ethereum’s creator, Vitalik Buterin, in one of his
recent talks ([9]). These two factors facilitate contracts that
gain utility from storing small amounts of data per user and
have low computational complexity, such as ERC20 tokens.
As a result, such contracts have very low transaction fees for
their operations. Third and most importantly, Ethereum’s state
must be maintained by all full nodes, yet there is no incentive
mechanism in place for freeing storage. If left unchecked,
this can have serious consequences. It will diminish the
mining population as proportionally fewer and fewer miners
will be able to contribute to the network. This will lead to
centralization and may prohibit new nodes from joining and
syncing to the network. This will have a direct impact on
Ethereum’s security and, utlimately, its longevity.
In this work, we introduce an alternative paradigm for
developing dApps on top of smart contract platforms by
decoupling the issue of storage from verifying the validity
of data. The former is handled by an external, potentially
unreliable, storage network that allows efficient access to the
application’s data. To verify the validity of data obtained from
the storage network, we maintain cryptographic accumulators
in the smart contract’s state. These are data structures that
provide a constant-sized representation of a set of elements
and allow for verifiable (non) membership proofs. To evaluate
our approach, we present a case study of an accumulator-
based implementation of the ERC20 token standard. We
choose this standard because it is the most widely deployed
token standard for fungible tokens, numbering over 130,000
compliant contracts on Ethereum’s live chain ([6]). Via minor
modifications, our construction can be modified to fit other,
upcoming standards, such as the ERC721 standard ([10]) for
non-fungible tokens. However, we stress that our approach
can be adapted to any application that requires a verifiable
representation of its application data, e.g., naming services,
voting systems or any kind of key-value store.
By requiring only minimal (constant-sized) state to be stored
in the contract, our accumulator-based approach promotes
diversity, scalability, and security of the Ethereum network.
Yet, we show that under Ethereum’s current cost model,
this accumulator-based approach is penalized for the security
properties it provides; it is much more (almost prohibitively)
costly than the approach of storing each account’s token
balance in the contract state. This illustrates one of Ethereum’s
main incentive misalignments. To address this, we revisit
Ethereum’s storage cost model and propose modifications that:
1) price storage-related operations based on the effort that
miners have to expend to execute them, 2) ensure that contracts
pay recurring fees proportionate to the amount of storage
they consume and the system’s overall capacity and, 3) free
space consumed by unused/stale contracts. We show that under
such a pricing scheme, our accumulator-based ERC20 token
construction reduces the incurred transaction fees by up to
an order of magnitude. With these modifications, we hope the
Ethereum developer community will be encouraged to exercise
economy in the state consumed by the smart contracts they
develop.
II. ETHEREUM
Ethereum is a blockchain-based, 32-byte word, global com-
puter that allows the development of smart contracts, i.e.,
stateful agents that “live” in the blockchain and can execute
arbitrary state transition functions. Smart contract code is writ-
ten in a high-level, Turing-complete programming language
(e.g., Solidity [11]), which is then compiled-down to Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM) initialization code. Contracts are
deployed by wrapping their initialization code in a transaction,
signing it and broadcasting it to the network. Users can interact
with smart contracts by broadcasting appropriately formatted
transactions. Smart contracts are “passive” entities that, as a
result of a user’s transaction, can issue message calls, i.e.,
call functions of other contracts. Ethereum’s cryptocurrency is
called ether and serves as a means to incentivize participants
(miners) to engage in the protocol. Transactions fees are
measured in a unit called gas and are a function of the byte
size and the complexity of the code invoked by transactions
(if any). Each transaction byte and EVM operation costs some
predefined amount of gas ([3]). Transactions specify a gas
price, which converts ether to gas and influences the incentive
of miners to include it in their next block. A transaction that
consumes gcost gas and specifies a gas price of gprice will
cost E = gcost× gprice units of ether. Lastly, transactions and
message calls, specify an upper bound on the amount of gas
that they can consume. This protects miners from, e.g., getting
stuck in an infinite loop, an issue that stems from Ethereum’s
Turing-completeness.
III. HASH TREE UNIVERSAL ACCUMULATOR
Cryptographic accumulators provide a constant representa-
tion of a set of elements and allow for verifiable member-
ship queries. Universal accumulators also allow for verifiable
non membership queries. Proving statements (e.g., element
membership) is facilitated via values that are referred to as
witnesses. Informally, the security property of accumulators
states that an adversary is unable to generate a valid witness
value for a false statement, except with negligible probability.
For instance, an adversary is not able to generate a valid
membership witness for an element x that is not part of
the accumulated set of elements X . It is common to refer
to the party that maintains and manages the accumulator as
the accumulator manager. In our accumulator-based ERC20
token, this role is played by the smart contract.
In the following, we provide a high level description of
the hash tree, universal accumulator of Camacho et al. [12],
whose security is based on collision-resistant hash functions.
This accumulator employs a public data structure m = (T,X)
(referred to as memory), where X = {x1, ..., xn} is the set of
accumulated elements and T is a binary, balanced hash tree.
The accumulator’s value (denoted as Acc) is the hash of T ’s
root node. Camacho et al. [12] model their accumulator as a
tuple of the following algorithms:
• Setup(k) : On input the security parameter k ∈ N, it
outputs the accumulator’s initial value Acc0 ∈ {0, 1}k,
which corresponds to the set X = ∅, and an initialized
memory m0.
• Witness(Acc,m, x) : This algorithm outputs a member-
ship or a non membership witness W , if x ∈ X or if
x /∈ X , respectively.
• Belongs(Acc, x,W) : This algorithm outputs 1, if W is a
valid witness for x ∈ X , 0, if W is a valid witness for
x /∈ X , or ⊥ otherwise.
• Updateop(Accbefore,mbefore, x) : This algorithm updates
the accumulator’s value by either adding (op = add) or
removing (op = del) the element x to/from the accu-
mulated set X . It outputs the updated values of the
accumulator (Accafter) and its memory (mafter), as well
as, an update witness Wop.
• CheckUpdate(Accbefore,Accafter, x,Wop) : This algorithm
outputs 1, if Wop is a valid witness for an update oper-
ation (op ∈ {add, del}) pertaining element x, which up-
dated the accumulator’s value from Accbefore to Accafter,
otherwise, it outputs 0.
This accumulator is strong, i.e., it does not require a trusted
setup nor a trusted accumulator manager. It allows for updates
(additions and deletions) that can be performed without having
access to secret information and are publicly verifiable. The
latter is accomplished via the CheckUpdate algorithm which,
on input a witness returned by Updateop and the accumulator’s
values before and after the update, outputs 1, if the update
was performed honestly, and 0, otherwise. In this accumulator,
(non) membership and update witnesses are hash path(s)
starting from some node(s) in T (not necessarily leaf node(s))
that lead all the way up to the root node. Thus, their size is
O(k log
2
(n)), where n = |X |.
IV. ACCUMULATOR-BASED ERC20 TOKEN
The ERC20 token standard ([8]) describes the functions
and events that facilitate the exchange of arbitrary crypto-
assets. Each token holder’s account is associated with an
Ethereum address data type. The token balance of each
account is commonly represented as a uint data type, i.e.,
an unsigned integer. The ERC20 token interface is comprised
of the following functions:
1) totalSupply() : Outputs the total supply of tokens
accross all accounts.
2) balanceOf (address owner) : Outputs the token bal-
ance of the input account.
3) approve(address spender,uint tokens) : The ac-
count that issues the call (transaction) to this function
authorizes the “spender” account to transfer the spec-
ified number of tokens from her account.
4) allowance(address owner, address spender) :
Outputs the number of tokens that the spender’s account
is approve’d to transfer from the owner’s account.
5) transfer(address to,uint tokens) : The account
that issues the call (transaction) to this function transfers
the specified number of tokens to the “to” account.
6) transferFrom(address from, address to,uint
tokens) :Transfers the specified number of tokens
from account ”from“ to the approve’d account ”to“.
To facilitate the aforementioned functionality, ERC20 com-
pliant smart contracts store two mappings in their state: 1)
balances, which maps account addresses to token balances
and, 2) allowed, which maps account addresses to another
mapping where, the latter, maintains the balance that each
approve’d account is allowed to transfer from the token
owner’s account.
We now illustrate how we employ the hash tree, universal
accumulator of Camacho et al. [12] (Section III), to realize an
accumulator-based ERC20 token. The core idea is to replace
each aforementioned mapping with one accumulator. We re-
place the balancesmapping with an accumulator, balancesAcc,
that accumulates (owner,tokens) tuples and allows clients to
infer each account’s token balance. For the allowed map-
ping, which is a “double” mapping, we need two accumula-
tors. The first accumulator, allowedAddressesAcc, accumulates
(owner,spender) tuples and allows clients to infer the accounts
that token owners have approve’d. The second accumulator,
allowedBalancesAcc, accumulates (spender,tokens) tuples and
allows clients to infer the token balance that approve’d
accounts are allowed to transfer from the owner’s account.
Thus, we have a constant-sized and verifiable representation
of account balances and allowances.
Our design’s security depends solely on that of the smart
contract platform (Ethereum in our case) and the accumulator
scheme. This allows us to employ a variety of primitives to
realize the storage network, whose concrete specification we
leave as future work. For instance, even centralized cloud
storage services are a viable option. However, we believe
that the best approach is a distributed file storage system,
especially one that has “bridges” with the Ethereum network.
Some notable examples are Swarm ([13]), Storj ([14]) and
IPFS ([15]). The storage network’s state is assumed to be
comprised of the memory data structure (see Section III) of
each of the aforementioned accumulators. As we show below,
the interaction with accumulator-based ERC20 smart contracts
requires the construction of (non) membership and update
witnesses by the clients which, subsequently, are subject to
verification by the smart contract. Clients construct these
witnesses by interacting with the storage network. We stress
that clients do not need to download the entire memory of
accumulators to construct these witnesses. The data that needs
to be transmitted from storage nodes to clients are hash paths
from the appropriate accumulators’ hash trees, i.e., they are
of logarithmic complexity. Thus, from hereon in, we assume
that clients can efficiently construct the witness values that are
required to realize the ERC20 token interface.
Accumulator-based ERC20 token smart contracts cannot
implement the balanceOf and allowance functions since
they do not store account balances and allowances in their
state. Instead, clients are able to infer the information obtained
by these functions by interacting with the storage network. To
infer the balance y of account x, clients construct and verify
a membership witness that the tuple (x, y) is accumulated in
balancesAcc. To infer the allowance z of a spender’s account
x2 from an owner’s account x1, clients construct and verify
two membership witnesses. First, a membership witness that
the tuple (x1, x2) is accumulated in allowedAddressesAcc,
which proves that the token owner x1 has allowed the spender
account x2 to transfer some tokens from her account. Second,
a membership witness that the tuple (x2, z) is accumulated in
allowedBalancesAcc, which proves the number of tokens the
spender is allowed to transfer from the token owner’s account.
An account x1 with balance y1 that wishes to transfer z
tokens (y1 ≥ z) to an account x2 with balance y2 produces
the following proofs. First, a membership witness for the tuple
(x1, y1) in balancesAcc, which proves the owner’s account
balance. Second, a membership witness for the tuple (x2, y2),
which proves the balance of the destination account. Third,
an update witness for the deletion of the tuple (x1, y1) from
balancesAcc. Fourth, an update witness for the deletion of the
tuple (x2, y2) from balancesAcc. Fifth, an update witness for
the addition of the tuple (x1, y1 − z) to balancesAcc. Sixth,
an update witness for the addition of the tuple (x2, y2 + z) to
balancesAcc. Notice that the sequence of the involved updates
reflects the transfer of z tokens from x1 to x2.
Due to space limitations, we are unable to describe how
we realize the approve and transferFrom operations. To
provide insight with regards to their complexity, we men-
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Fig. 1: Gas cost versus of the transfer, approve and
transferFrom operations of our accumulator-based ERC20
token construction for up to a total of 400,000 accounts and
400,000 approvals.
tion the proofs that are involved in each operation. The
approve operation involves two update witnesses and either
one non membership, or, one membership witness, depending
on whether the token owner approves the spender’s account
for the first time or not, respectively. The transferFrom
operation involves four membership witnesses and six update
witnesses. Thus, the transferFrom is the most expensive
operation, followed by transfer and, lastly, by approve.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our accumulator-based ERC20
token construction. We ran our experiments on a private
blockchain that is maintained by a single mining node. We
use the latest, stable version of geth (v1.8.17, [16]), Ethereum’s
official client, that was available at the time of this writing. We
conducted our experiments via the truffle suite (v4.1.13, [17])
that employs solc-js (v0.4.24, [18]) to compile smart contracts
with optimizations enabled.
Figure 1 illustrates the gas cost of the transfer, approve
and transferFrom operations of our accumulator-based
ERC20 token for up to a total of 400,000 accounts and
400,000 approvals. Results illustrate that transaction gas costs
scale logarithmically, which is expected (same holds for
the approve operation). Recall that all involved proofs are
hash path(s) starting from some node(s) (not necessarily
leaf node(s)) in the accumulator’s tree. Thus, their size and
verification cost varies based on the position of those nodes in
the tree. Our construction’s operations consume a large portion
of the block’s limit which is, currently, about 8 million gas
([19]). In the following, we discuss a series of improvements
that will diminish the cost of our construction’s operations.
The security property of the accumulator of Camacho et
al. [12] is based on the presupposition that, prior to an
invocation of CheckUpdate for the deletion or addition of
some element x, x ∈ X or x /∈ X , respectively. Thus,
prior to, e.g., verifying the addition of some element x via
the CheckUpdate algorithm, we have to make sure, via a
non membership witness verification, that x /∈ X . Part of
an ongoing project is to provide a proof extension that will
allow us to lift this assumption from the accumulator’s security
property. Consequently, we will be able to eliminate one, two
and four invocations of the accumulator’s Belongs algorithm
from the approve, transfer and transferFrom operations
of the accumulator-based ERC20 token, respectively. Note that
one invocation of Belongs costs, on average, 289,873.23 gas,
when |X | = 400, 000 and will, thus, provide a substantial
improvement.
Our implementation of the hash tree accumulator employs
the SHA-256 hash function, which is exposed as a precompiled
contract in Ethereum. Precompiled contracts reside on well-
known, static addresses and constitute Ethereum’s “standard
library”, similar to that of common programming languages.
The advantage of precompiled contracts is that their compu-
tation incurs low gas costs because their code runs on the
miner’s machine language. The computational cost of the
SHA-256 hash function is 60 gas, plus 12 gas per input
word (rounded up) and its implementation complies to the
NIST standard. However, the KECCAK-256 hash function,
whose computational cost is 30 gas, plus 6 gas per input
word (rounded up), does not comply to the NIST standard
and is, instead, implemented as an EVM opcode. Moreover,
precompiled contracts, at each invocation, incur the extra gas
cost of a message call, which is 700 gas. However, that is
not the case for EVM opcodes. Thus, Ethereum promotes the
use of a non-standard compliant hash function. Recently, a
proposal has been submitted ([20]) that suggests the removal
of the message call gas cost for precompiled contracts, which
we believe is fair. Furthermore, we believe that the gas cost of
these hash functions should be equalized. Assuming that both
of the aforementioned suggestions are applied, the gas cost of
the hashing operations will be reduced by 93.69% and, as a
result, will further diminish the gas cost of the accumulator-
based ERC20 token operations.
To illustrate the overhead of our accumulator-based
ERC20 token construction, we implemented a “bare-bones”
ERC20 token (where account balances and allowances are
stored in the contract’s state [21]) and repeated the same
experiment. We measure an average cost of 33,193.12,
42,465.23 and 23,798.35 gas for the transfer, approve
and transferFrom operations, respectively. Thus, our
accumulator-based construction is much more expensive, de-
spite its constant and minimal space overhead on Ethereum’s
state. The large discrepancy between the gas cost of the two
constructions’ operations, as well as, the small and static gas
cost of the bare-bones ERC20 token operations, are a by-
product of Ethereum’s flat cost model. The fact that storage-
related operations are underpriced ([9]) and that contracts do
not pay a recurring fee proportional to the size of their state is
one of Ethereum’s main incentive misalignments. This issue,
if left unchecked, will have severe consequences to the future
of, not only Ethereum, but any smart contract platform that
employs a flat cost model. Next, we propose modifications to
Ethereum’s cost model to deal with this issue.
VI. REVISITING ETHEREUM’S STORAGE COST MODEL
Ethereum employs a flat cost model to price all EVM
opcodes ([3]), including storage-related operations. There are
two main issues with this approach. First, storing data on
the state of smart contracts incurs a one time fee which is
underpriced ([9]). To our knowledge, there is no other, real
world system that provides such high levels of data replication
and availability without a recurring fee that is proportional
to the volume of the stored data. Furthermore, as there is no
incentive for freeing storage, Ethereum is faced with a tragedy
of the commons problem with regards to the monotonically
increasing size of its state. Second, Ethereum’s flat cost model
does not account for the complexity of executing storage-
related operations, which is a function of the size of the state
of smart contracts. We propose the following modifications to
Ethereum’s pricing of storage to address these issues.
Recurring Storage Fees: The concept of introducing “stor-
age rent”, i.e., a recurring fee that smart contracts have to
pay based on the amount of storage they consume has been
discussed over the years. Buterin’s original proposal ([22]) has
spurred a lot of discussion and has led to the publication of
several articles (e.g., [23]–[25]) which, in their vast majority,
stress how important such a mechanism is for the longevity of
public blockchains. An additional use of the rent mechanism
is to clean up Ethereum’s state from accounts (contracts are
accounts as well) that are not being used anymore.
Our proposal on the subject of storage rent is based on the
following points. First, we believe that rent fees should not be
rewarded to anyone as that could introduce new attack vectors.
Second, since Ethereum is a global computer, it is rational
to assume that it has a predefined storage capacity Smax
(e.g., Buterin has suggested 500 GB [26]). Naturally, this is a
conceptual upper bound on the state’s size and will, essentially,
reflect an estimate of what is considered reasonable for the
average miner. Third, Smax should be adjustable by the ones
that maintain the network, i.e., the miners, to account for real
world, storage trends. This could be achieved via a mechanism
similar to the one that is already in use for adjusting block
difficulty. We propose that up to a low utilization percentage of
the system’s state, e.g., Ulow = 25%, the rent per storage key
of a contract’s state should be static to reflect the low burden
imposed on miners. When the state’s utilization is between
Ulow and, e.g., Uhigh = 80%, the rent per storage key of a
contract’s state should increase logarithmically with the total
number of keys in the system’s state. This reflects the fact
that Ethereum’s state is organized on top of LevelDB whose
complexity we elaborate more on the following paragraph.
From thereon in, rent fees should be prohibitive, thus, they
should scale linearly to the total number of keys in the
system’s state. To derive a base rent fee per storage key, we
considered real world examples of systems that are highly
replicated, available and charge for storage. Cloud storage
providers are a prime example. For instance, Amazon’s EFS
([27]) charges 0.30 USD per GB per month. At the time of
this writing, one unit of Ether corresponds to 202.18 USD
([28]). Based on this analogy, we compute a base rent fee of
Rbase = 530, 657, 634.8Wei per storage key per year (1 Ether
corresponds to 1018 Wei). Thus, we have an adaptable scheme
for computing rent fees that follows the laws of supply and
demand by considering the state’s overall utilization and the
burden imposed on miners.
Scaling Storage Costs: A contract’s state is organized on
an on-disk Merkle Patricia (MP) trie ([29]), which is referred
to as the storage trie. This is a modified version of a typical
radix tree with the added property of Merkle trees, i.e., the
root hash uniquely identifies the (key,value) pairs in the tree.
The nodes of the storage trie and the smart contract’s state
(storage keys) are stored in a LevelDB ([30]) key-value store,
whose underlying data structure is a multi-level Log Structured
Merge (LSM) tree. As illustrated in a recent study ([31]), due
to Ethereum’s authenticated storage (MP trie), one Ethereum
read (e.g., reading the root node of a contract’s storage trie)
can lead to 64 LevelDB get() (read) requests. Each get()
may internally involve multiple disk reads due to the large
amount of metadata that LevelDB maintains ([32]). Updates to
a contract’s storage, e.g., adding/updating storage keys, result
in updates to its storage trie that have to be committed on disk.
In LevelDB, key-value updates are reinserted into a skip list
with a monotonically increasing sequence number along with
a “tombstone” flag that invalidates the pair’s prior version.
To maintain key-value pairs in sorted order, LevelDB uses
a compaction method. This process involves multiple merge
sorts (one per LSM tree level) and incurs a write amplification
factor, which is the ratio of the amount of data written to the
amount of data requested for writing by users, of ×11 ([32]).
Ethereum’s flat cost model does not reflect the aforemen-
tioned complexity of storage-related operations. One might
assume that an ideal scheme would scale the cost of these
operations based on the number of incurred disk operations.
However, this is not possible as Ethereum miners do not have
a shared hardware configuration, e.g., their physical hard disks
and their caches vary significantly. This would interfere with
Ethereum’s consensus as the execution of the same transaction
would lead to different gas costs across different miners.
Instead, we propose a scheme where the cost of storage-related
operations is computed on a per transaction basis and scales
according to the number of operations to LevelDB’s LSM tree,
which is the same across all miners. Fetching one key from a
LSM tree involves two binary searches ([33]). Accessing the
value of a smart contract’s storage key involves, at minimum,
fetching one node of its storage trie and, subsequently, fetching
the storage key itself. Thus, it requires a total of four binary
searches, i.e., 4 log
2
(n) accesses, where n is the number
of storage keys. Updating, or, adding a new storage key,
involves the same number of accesses to infer the value of
the tombstone flag. However, since updates are propagated
to all levels of LevelDB’s LSM tree during its compaction
process, they are subject to LevelDB’s write amplification
factor, which we discussed above. Thus, updates incur a total
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Fig. 2: Gas cost versus of the transfer (a), transferFrom (b) and approve (c) operations of the ERC20 token and the
accumulator-based ERC20 token for up to a total of 400,000 accounts and 400,000 approvals under the new storage cost model.
of 11× 4 log
2
(n) = 44 log
2
(n) operations. Currently, reading,
storing and updating storage keys costs 200, 20,000 and 5,000
gas, respectively. Thus, under our proposed scheme, the cost
of, e.g., reading a storage key is 200× 4 log
2
(n).
Figure 2 illustrates the gas cost of the transfer,
transferFrom and approve operations of the bare-bones
and our accumulator-based ERC20 token under our proposed
cost model. Regarding the bare-bones ERC20 token, we only
plot the storage-related cost of its operations, which are the
dominant factor. The biggest discrepancy is in the approve
operation (Figure 2c) where our accumulator-based construc-
tion provides an order of magnitude improvement. Overall,
results illustrate that, under a pricing scheme that reflects the
effort that miners have to expend to execute storage-related
operations, the programming paradigm that we propose in
this work provides reduced gas costs across all ERC20 token
operations. Nevertheless, we believe that the most important
property of our approach is that it aligns well with the future
of smart contract platforms since it incurs constant storage
overhead to miners.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduce an alternative programming paradigm for de-
veloping dApps that promotes diversity, scalability and aligns
well with the future of smart contract platforms. Our approach
can be adapted to any application that requires a verifiable
representation of its application data. We propose a scheme
for computing rent fees that follows the laws of supply and
demand by considering the state’s overall utilization, as well
as the burden imposed on miners. In addition, our scheme is
adjustable to real world, storage trends. We introduce scaling
of the cost of storage-related operations to account for the
effort that miners have to expend to execute them. Lastly,
we show that under such a pricing scheme that encourages
economy in the state consumed by smart contracts, our ERC20
token adaptation reduces the incurred transaction fees by up
to an order of magnitude.
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